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Abstract
This paper presents an algorithmic framework for learn-
ing robust policies in asymmetric imperfect-information
games, where the joint reward could depend on the
uncertain opponent type (a private information known
only to the opponent itself and its ally). In order to
maximize the reward, the protagonist agent has to in-
fer the opponent type through agent modeling. We use
multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) to learn op-
ponent models through self-play, which captures the
full strategy interaction and reasoning between agents.
However, agent policies learned from self-play can suf-
fer from mutual overfitting. Ensemble training meth-
ods can be used to improve the robustness of agent
policy against different opponents, but it also signifi-
cantly increases the computational overhead. In order
to achieve a good trade-off between the robustness of
the learned policy and the computation complexity, we
propose to train a separate opponent policy against the
protagonist agent for evaluation purposes. The reward
achieved by this opponent is a noisy measure of the
robustness of the protagonist agent policy due to the
intrinsic stochastic nature of a reinforcement learner.
To handle this stochasticity, we apply a stochastic op-
timization scheme to dynamically update the opponent
ensemble to optimize an objective function that strikes
a balance between robustness and computation com-
plexity. We empirically show that, under the same lim-
ited computational budget, the proposed method results
in more robust policy learning than standard ensemble
training.
Introduction
Recent advances in deep reinforcement learning (DRL) have
achieved breakthroughs in solving challenging decision-
making problems in both single-agent environments (Mnih
et al. 2013), (Hausknecht and Stone 2015), (Andrychow-
icz et al. 2018) and multiagent games (Silver et al. 2017),
(Moravcˇı´k et al. 2017), (Jaderberg et al. 2018), (OpenAI
2018), (Vinyals et al. 2019). Multiagent reinforcement learn-
ing (MARL) deals with multiple agents concurrently learn-
ing in a multiagent environment such as a multiagent game.
One of the difficulties of learning in multiagent environ-
ments is that, in general, the state transition and reward de-
pend on the joint action of all the agents. As a result, the best
response of each agent depends on the joint policy of all the
rest agents. This inter-dependency between agents makes it
generally impossible to learn an optimal policy from a single
agent prospect. In order to determine one’s optimal policy,
each agent has to reason about the likely policies of the other
agents, and plans for its action accordingly, which is much
more complicated than the single agent case.
Many of the successful MARL applications deal with
two-player symmetric zero-sum games such as (Silver et al.
2017), (Moravcˇı´k et al. 2017), (Heinrich and Silver 2016),
which was proved to have a Nash Equilibrium strategy pro-
file that is equal to both the maximin strategy and the mini-
max strategy. This implies that the optimal policies in those
games can be solved by using the worst case opponent pol-
icy. Since the game is symmetric, self-play is used which as-
signs one’s own policy to its opponent, essentially reducing
the multiagent learning problem to a single agent learning
problem.
In more general scenarios, there could be multiple equi-
librium profiles. Agents do not necessarily adopt the equilib-
rium policy from the same equilibrium policy profile. As a
result, solving for all the equilibrium profiles does not entail
finding the optimal policies. Reasoning about other agents’
policies becomes crucial for optimizing one’s own policy.
Opponent modeling
Opponent modeling studies the problem of constructing
models to reason about and make predictions about various
properties (e.g. actions, goals, etc.) of the modelled agents.
Classic methods, such as policy reconstruction (Carmel and
Markovitch 1998), (Chakraborty and Stone 2014) and plan
recognition, (Fagan and Cunningham 2003), (Sohrabi, Ri-
abov, and Udrea 2016) etc., develop parametric models to
model agent behaviors (Albrecht and Stone 2018). One of
the limitations of these approaches is the requirement of
domain-specific models, which could be difficult to acquire.
Moreover, these models tend to decouple the interactions be-
tween the modeling agent and the modeled agents to sim-
plify the modeling process, which is likely to be biased
where strong coupling exists between agent rewards and in-
teractions. In contrast, a more natural approach of opponent
modeling is concurrently training all the agents via MARL
in a self-play manner (Bansal et al. 2017), (Lowe et al.
2017), (Raileanu et al. 2018). This approach requires little
domain-specific knowledge order than a black-box simula-
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tor. The interactions between the modeling agent and the
modeled agents are fully captured in the joint observations,
state-action pairs, and rewards. Moreover, concurrent learn-
ing provides a natural curriculum with the right level of dif-
ficulty for each agent (Bansal et al. 2017).
Ensemble training
MARL in general-sum games, however, is more challeng-
ing than that in two-player zero-sum games. A general-
sum game may have multiple equilibria, corresponding to
a variety of diverse strong policies. During the training, the
agents might have only seen a small subset of these poli-
cies, which could lead to significant performance degrada-
tion when playing against unseen opponent policies. A com-
mon approach to mitigate this type of ‘policy over-fitting’
is training policy ensembles such as in (Lowe et al. 2017;
Jaderberg et al. 2017; Jaderberg et al. 2018). Each policy
ensemble consists of several policies for each agent, which
would be robust on average against all the policies within
the ensembles of other agents. Ensemble training has also
been widely applied to learning classifiers that are robust to
adversarial attacks in computer vision (Trame`r et al. 2017).
Although ensemble training improves the policy robust-
ness, it also significantly increases the computational com-
plexity, as each policy within an ensemble has to be opti-
mized against ensembles of policies of other agents. In ad-
dition, choosing the right size of the ensemble is critical. A
large ensemble size would likely result in high robustness
but poor scalability, while a small size would scale better
but potentially lead to a less robust policy. Therefore, find-
ing a reasonable ensemble size that maintains a good trade-
off between robustness and complexity is highly desirable,
which has not been addressed in the related works. One fun-
damental issue with these works is the lack of a quantitative
measure of robustness. Without this measure, we cannot op-
timize the ensemble size and the population selection.
Imperfect information and belief space planning
Imperfect-information and partial observability is another
common difficulty in decision-making problems. Partially
observable Markov decision process (POMDP) (Kaelbling,
Littman, and Cassandra 1998) decentralized-POMDP (Dec-
POMDP) (Oliehoek, Amato, and others 2016) and Partially
observable stochastic games (POSG) (Hansen, Bernstein,
and Zilberstein 2004) are the decision-making models for
single agent, multiagent fully cooperative and multiagent
general sum scenarios, respectively. Model-based planning
is the most prevalent technique for solving POMDP and
Dec-POMDP (e.g., (Kurniawati, Hsu, and Lee ), (Somani
et al. 2013), (Seuken and Zilberstein 2007)). In POMDP, a
value function satisfying Bellmen equation can be defined
on the belief space. Piece-wise linear convexity (PWLC) is
an important property of finite horizon POMDP value func-
tions (Kaelbling, Littman, and Cassandra 1998). This prop-
erty implies that belief state of high uncertainty has lower
value while that of low uncertainty has higher value. Emer-
gent exploration behavior is a natural result of PWLC.
Recurrent policy
Belief space policy, where the belief is a sufficient statis-
tics of the action-observation history, is a special case of
recurrent policy. One limitation of belief space planning
is the requirement of an environment model for belief up-
date, which is typically unavailable or intractable in sce-
narios with complex environments. In model-free DRL, re-
current neural network (RNN) is a widely used architecture
to handle partial observability. Although RNN-based DRL
approaches have achieved impressive successes in partially
observable domains (e.g., (Jaderberg et al. 2018), (OpenAI
2018), (Vinyals et al. 2019)), we identified two limitations of
model-free learning with RNN: First, learning exploration
behavior could be challenging. To the best of the the au-
thors’ knowledge, there is little evidence in literature show-
ing emergent exploration behavior learned by RNN alone.
Our conjecture is that RNN has to simultaneously learn an
encoding of the action−observation history that has a sim-
ilar information structure as the belief space, and a map-
ping from this hidden encoding to an optimal action. This
is a more challenging learning task that a single black-
box RNN might struggle to accomplish, as compared with
model-based planning. Second, since there is no belief state
in the RNN approach, RNN policy learns directly from the
actual reward instead of the belief space reward. The actual
reward could be very noise due to different realizations of
the hidden state. This high reward variance poses challenges
to reinforcement learning algorithms.
Besides, within the imperfect information and partially
observable domains, different problems have different levels
of difficulty. Most works deal with domains where the hid-
den state has a well-modeled probabilistic relationship with
the observations, such as partial observability due to sen-
sor noise or failure (Silver and Veness 2010), limited field
of view (Temizer et al. ), screen flickering (Hausknecht and
Stone 2015). These types of partial observability are rela-
tively simple, in the sense that the hidden information can
be inferred without bias via Bayes’ rule. In the rest cases,
the hidden state cannot be directly inferred from the obser-
vation. For example, in Poker game, the observation is all
the hands that have been played, and the hidden state is the
hands that have not been revealed. There is no probabilistic
relationship between the hidden state and the observation.
Nonetheless, inferring the hidden state is still possible given
knowledge about the agent types and assumptions about ra-
tionality (agent modeling). For example, in Bayesian game
theory, a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium is well-defined given a
joint equilibrium policy profile assuming perfect rationality
(Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine 2004). However, this belief
is likely to be biased since it is unlikely that the actual agent
adopts the exact model policy. Moreover, in even more com-
plicated imperfect-information scenarios, agent types could
also be uncertain. For example, in one-night werewolf game,
(Toriumi et al. 2016) agents do not know whether the other
agents are their ally or enemy. In this case, one has to jointly
reason about the (hidden) agent types and their policies,
which is more challenging than the aforementioned situa-
tions.
This paper presents an algorithmic framework for learn-
ing robust policies in asymmetric imperfect-information
competitive games. We mainly focus on the scenarios where
the opponent type is unknown to the protagonist agent but
the joint reward is strongly correlated with this hidden type.
This setting models a spectrum of real world scenarios, but
has seldomly been studied in the context of MARL.
Preliminary
In this section, we review the preliminary of the decision-
making framework and solution techniques.
Partially observable stochastic games
A partially observable stochastic game (POSG) is a tuple
〈I,S, {b0}, {Ai}, {Oi},P, {Ri}〉, where,
• I is a finite set of agents indexed by 1, . . . , n
• S is a state space
• b0 ∈ ∆(S) is the prior state distribution
• Ai is the action space of each agent, and we use a =
〈a1, . . . , an〉 to denote the joint action
• Oi is the observation space for each agent, and we use
o = 〈o1, . . . , on〉 to denote the joint observation
• P is the Markovian state transition and observation prob-
ability, which is denoted as P(s′|s,a) and P(o|s,a)
• Ri : S × −→A → < is the reward function of each agent
Asymmetric imperfect-information POSG
In this paper, we primarily focus on a special subset
of POSG, which we refer to as asymmetric imperfect-
information game (AIIG). We define AIIG as POSG where
not all the agents hold the same initial belief over the state
and agent type distributions, i.e., b0i 6= b0j , for some i, j ∈ I,
where i 6= j, in contrast to the common prior assumption in
Bayesian games, which is unrealistic in some scenarios.
AIIG models a variety of real world scenarios. For exam-
ple, in poker games, agents have perfect knowledge of their
own cards while maintain a belief distribution over the oth-
ers. Therefore, each agent has its own initial belief that is
distinct from the others. In a buyer-seller game, the seller
knows the true value of the goods while the buyer does not,
which leads to different initial belief over the value of the
goods. In an urban-security scenario, suppose a police offi-
cer wants to identify a terrorist among a swarm of people.
The officer does not have prior knowledge over the type of
each person, so he has to assign the same belief to each of
the people. In contrast, the terrorist knows his own type and
the type of all the other innocent.
Within AIIG, we focus on a special subset, where the pro-
tagonist agent is uncertain about the types of its opponents,
while its opponents have full observability over the global
state. This special case is difficult for the protagonist, as its
opponents have information advantages.
POSG with extended observation space
We propose a small modification to the POSG framework,
which we refer to as POSG with extended observation space
(POSGEOS). In POSG, one of the general assumptions is
that agent cannot observe the observations and actions of the
other agents. We propose to extend the observation space
Figure 1: Illustration of the workflow: we train one protag-
onist policy that uses an internal opponent model for belief
update. The opponent model is learned by distilling an en-
semble of opponent policies trained against the protagonist
policy. Both the protagonist and the opponent improve their
skills through this self-play
with the actions taken by the other agents. We argue that
this is a realistic assumption in many real game scenarios.
For example, in the buyer-seller game, the actions are the
prices proposed by the buyer or the seller, which is observed
by both agents. In games with deterministic state transition,
often the actions taken by agents could be deduced from the
state transition. Effectively, the actions are also observable
in these games.
The motivation of proposing POSGEOS is for tackling
imperfect-information scenarios with uncertain agent types.
The idea is to infer the hidden types of the other agents
from observing their actions, by reasoning about their poli-
cies based on some rationality assumption.
Belief space reward
In single agent partially observable domains, value function
is defined as the expected cumulative reward with respect to
the state-action distribution under the belief space policy pi,
V
pi
(b0) =
∞∑
t=0
γ
t∑
st
p(s
t
)r(s
t
, a
t
)
=
∞∑
t=0
γ
tEst∼p(st),at∼pi(bt)[R(s
t
, a
t
)],
(1)
where p(st) is the state distribution, and bt is the belief over
state. If the belief is unbiased, then p(st) = b(st), and Eq. 1
degenerate to
V
pi
(b
0
) =
∞∑
t=0
γ
t
r(b
t
, a
t
), (2)
where r(b, a) = Es∼b(s)[r(s, a)] is the belief space reward. In
reinforcement learning, we sample reward from the environ-
ment. The belief space reward sample r(bt, at) clearly has
lower variance than the actual reward sample r(st, at), be-
cause the uncertainty associated with the state distribution
has been analytically marginalized out. As a result, learning
in the belief space benefits from the low reward variance, in
contrast to RNN-based approaches that learn directly from
state space reward which has higher variance.
In general, however, the state distribution pt and the be-
lief bt could be different, for example, when the environ-
ment model P used for belief update is biased. In this case,
the policy maximizing the belief space cumulative reward
Eq. 2 does not necessarily maximize the actual cumulative
reward Eq. 1. That is, the agent learns an optimal policy in
its imagined world, which is actually sub-optimal due to the
discrepancy between its world model and the actual world.
This makes it challenging to solve asymmetric imperfect-
information games with uncertain opponent types. On one
hand, we want to exploit belief space reward for stable learn-
ing. On the other hand, however, belief update requires an
opponent model, which is likely to be biased. Therefore, ac-
curately modeling the opponent is crucial in our problem.
Approach
We first give an overview of our approach. We use MARL
for policy learning, where competitive agents are trained
against each other to consistently improve their skills. We
use neural network to represent a belief space policy that
maps a belief over the hidden state to an action. The belief
state is updated via Bayes’ rule using a learned model of the
opponent policy. The opponent model learning process con-
sists of an ensemble policy training step and a policy distilla-
tion step. We apply a neuro-evolutionary method to improve
the diversity of the ensemble population for robustness. The
above steps are illustrated in ig. 1. We then developed a
stochastic optimization framework to meta-optimize the pol-
icy ensemble allocation for improved balance between ro-
bustness and complexity. We present the detail of each step
in the following sections.
MARL with ensemble training
In order to improve the policy robustness of the protagonist
agent, we formulate its RL objective as the average cumula-
tive reward against an ensemble of opponent policies of size
K, as in (Lowe et al. 2017),
J
(
pii
)
= E
k∼unif(1,K),ai∼pii,a−i∼pi(k)−i
 ∞∑
t=0
γ
t
ri(s,a)
 , (3)
where the policy ensemble {pi(k)−i , k = 1, 2, ..., K} is also
learned from training RL agent against the protagonist pol-
icy. Via this self-play, both the protagonist agent and its op-
ponent improve their policies. Nonetheless, there is no ex-
plicit mechanism to enforce distinction among the policies
within the ensemble. As a result, there could be redundant
policies that are very similar to the others.
To address this redundancy issue, we apply the coopera-
tive evolutionary reinforcement learning (CERL) approach
(Khadka et al. 2019). The key idea is to use different hyper-
parameter settings for each opponent policy, while use an
off-policy learning algorithm and a shared experience replay
buffer to keep the advantage of concurrently training multi-
ple policies. Furthermore, neuro-evolutionary algorithm is
applied to create mutated policies from the ensemble, and
the trajectory under the mutated policies are also stored in
the share experience replay buffer for better diversity and
exploration.
Belief space policy and belief update
In the asymmetric imperfect-information games, however,
the global state is not fully observable. We use the belief
space approach for agent policy learning. Agents explicitly
maintain a belief over the hidden states (e.g. hidden state in-
cludes the actual opponent types), and learns a belief space
policy that maps belief to action. We parameterize this map-
ping using a multi-layer perceptron (MLP). The learning ob-
jective, instead of Eq. 4, now becomes,
J
(
pii
)
= E
k∼unif(1,K),ai∼pii(bi),a−i∼pi(k)−i
 ∞∑
t=0
γ
t
ri(bi,a)
 .
(4)
A belief update mechanism is required to fully specify the
agent policy. The belief is the posterior distribution over
the hidden states given action and observation history, bti =
p(st|a0:ti , o0:ti ). In the proposed POSGEOS framework, agent
observation includes the actions taken by the other agents,
therefore,
b
t
i = p(s
t|a0:ti , a0:t−i, o¯0:ti ), (5)
where o¯ denotes the rest part of the observation excluding
other agents’ actions.
Using the Bayes’ rule, the following recursive update can
be derived,
b
t
i ∝ p(at−i|st)
∫
P(st|st−1,at)bt−1i ds
t−1
=
∫
p(a
t−i|ot, st)P(ot|st)dot
×
∫
P(st|st−1,at)bt−1i ds
t−1
.
(6)
In order to further simplify Eq. 6, we make the following
approximation,
p(a
t−i|ot, st) ≈
∏
j 6=i
pij(o
t
j |hj), (7)
where pij
(
otj |hj
)
denotes the action probability taken by
agent j with type hj when it observes otj . The assumption
behind Eq. 7 is: All the other agents make decision based
on their own observation, without any explicit coordination
mechanism.
Eq. 6 and 7 imply that we need the policies of agent j
of each possible type {h(m)
j
}Mm=1. Recall that in the ensem-
ble training step, we create K different policies {pi(k)
j,m
}Kk=1
for each agent of each type. Here we use shorthand pij,m to
denote agent j with type h(m)
j
. Each policy within one en-
semble can be interpreted as one of the likely strategies that
could be adopted by agent j with type h(m)
j
. However, in
the belief update equation, we need only one single policy
for agent j with type h(m)
j
. As a result, we need to synthe-
size the policy ensemble into one representative policy that
can best represent the average behavior of the policy ensem-
ble. We propose to learn this representative policy by min-
imizing information theoretic distance between this policy
and the policy ensemble. More specifically, we choose the
Kullback−Leibler (KL) divergence as the distance measure,
Procedure 1 Ensemble evaluation
1: Fix the protagonist policy
2: Train a single opponent policy against the fixed protag-
onist policy
3: Obtain the average protagonist agent reward rp and op-
ponent reward ro after training
and formulate the following minimization objective function
for learning the representative policy pi0j,m,
J(pi
0
j,m) =
K∑
k=1
KL(pi(k)
j,m
, pi
0
j,m)
=
K∑
k=1
E
pi
(k)
j,m
[
log pi
(k)
j,m
− log pi0j,m
]
.
(8)
Eq. 8 is essentially policy distillation (Teh et al. 2017). The
solution to this minimization is,
pi
0
j,m =
1
K
K∑
k=1
pi
(k)
j,m
, (9)
which happens to be a simple average over the policies
within one ensemble. Conceptually, this is straightforward
to implement. However, computationally, averaging K poli-
cies is undesirable, because K could be large. Instead, we
propose to store an additional action probability term into
the shared experience replay buffer, and fit a policy network
pˆi0j,m;θ to samples of action probability from the experience
replay using mean square error (MSE) loss. This operation
approximates Eq. 9, but at almost constant computational
complexity, since we do not need any additional computa-
tions to obtain the action probability sample.
Policy ensemble optimization
The ensemble training step typically improves the robust-
ness of the protagonist agent’s policy. However, two prob-
lems need to be addressed to make this approach more ef-
fective and efficient. First, we want a metrics for measur-
ing policy robustness and we want to explicitly optimize this
robustness metrics. Second, we want to minimize the addi-
tional computation overhead introduced by ensemble train-
ing.
We propose to address these two problems through a
meta-optimization of the policy ensemble. Instead of using
a fixed-size ensemble, we dynamically resize the ensemble
through three operations: pop, append and exchange. pop
randomly removes one policy from the ensemble and push
it into a deactivation-set. append randomly selects one pol-
icy from the deactivation-set and append it to the ensemble.
exchange randomly selects one policy from both the ensem-
ble and the deactivation-set and exchanges them with each
other.
The objective of modifying the ensemble is to obtain a
good trade-off between robustness and computational com-
plexity, which is dominated by the ensemble size. We pro-
pose to measure the robustness via Procedure 1,
and we define the following metrics,
ρ = −rp + λ1ro + λ2K, (10)
Procedure 2 Ensemble Optimization
1: Randomly select an operation ξ from {pop, append, ex-
change} to apply on the policy ensemble
2: Obtain a new metrics ρnew via Procedure 2
3: Accept the operation ξ with probability p, where p =
exp(min{0, ρold − ρnew}/T )
where λ1, λ2 are weight parameters, and K is the varying size
of the policy ensemble.
The combined reward term −rp + λ1ro is a measure of the
robustness of the protagonist policy, which is noisy due to
the intrinsic stochasticity of reinforcement learning, while K
is a surrogate measure for computation complexity. There-
fore, minimizing ρ leads to an optimal trade-off between
policy robustness and computation complexity. We interpret
this minimization problem as a stochastic optimization over
the powerset of the initial policy ensemble. We solve this
stochastic optimization via simulated annealing as described
in Procedure 2.
Evaluation
This section addresses the following questions:
1. Is it necessary to use ensemble training, considering its
additional computation overhead?
2. Is it beneficial to explicitly model opponent policy and
maintain a belief?
3. How much improvement do we get from ensemble train-
ing and ensemble meta-optimization?
Scenario: two-player asymmetric game
We design a two-player asymmetric-information game to
evaluate our algorithm, as illustrated in Fig. 2. There are two
agents: the protagonist agent (a grasshopper officer) and the
opponent agent with two possible types (either an ally beaver
or an enemy turtle). The opponent’s objective is to reach its
home base (depending on its type) as soon as possible. The
protagonist’s objective is to identify the type of its opponent,
and obtain reward by tagging the opponent if it turns out to
be an enemy turtle. Mistakenly tagging an ally beaver would
incur a large penalty to the protagonist. The grasshopper pro-
tagonist does not swim, so once the opponent jumps into the
river, the officer cannot tag it anymore. If the opponent is
an enemy turtle, it receives large penalty if tagged. The op-
ponent always receives penalty if it has not reached its base,
and the penalty increases with its distance from its base. The
detailed description of this game and the hyper-parameters
are provided in the supplement materials.
Based on the rule of this game, an enemy turtle might
take multiple different strategies. For example, one strategy
is to rush towards its home base to minimize the distance
penalty. However, the protagonist can quickly identify the
enemy and try to tag it. As a result, the enemy might end
up getting a huge penalty as being tagged. Another strategy
is to initially head towards the ally base, such that the offi-
cer would be fooled to believe that the opponent is an ally.
Once the enemy is close enough to the river, it can jump into
Figure 2: Asymmetric two player imperfect-information
scenario in a 2-d world: the protagonist is a grasshopper of-
ficer, while the opponent could be a beaver (ally) or a turtle
(enemy). The protagonist does not know the actual type of
the opponent because of the white cloak.
the river and rush to its base. This strategy incurs larger dis-
tance penalty, but eventually might get a higher reward by
avoiding being tagged.
Ensemble training vs. single model
To answer the first question, we compared the protagonist
policy learned from training against an ensemble of oppo-
nent policies and that from training against a single opponent
policy. We used a similar ensemble as used in (Khadka et al.
2019), which consists of four opponent policies, each policy
is learned from training against the protagonist policy. We
used four different discount factors for the opponent learn-
ing objectives: γ1 = 0.9, γ2 = 0.99, γ3 = 0.997, γ4 = 0.9995. An
interpretation of this setting is a variety of opponent playing
styles ranging from myopic to far-sighted strategies.
For comparison, we also trained the protagonist policy in-
dividually against each opponent model, so we obtained five
protagonist policies in total. For evaluation, we trained five
separate opponent evaluation policies, each corresponding
to one of the protagonist policies. The evaluation policies all
used the same discount factor γ = 0.99.
Fig. 3 shows the training and evaluation rewards. During
training, the single model policies generally lead to higher
protagonist reward, while the ensemble training results in
the lowest protagonist reward. This suggests that the protag-
onist policy overfits to one of the single opponent models,
thus achieving high training reward but low evaluation re-
ward. In contrast, the protagonist policy trained against the
ensemble achieves the best evaluation reward. It is worth
pointing out that, in the second single model setting, al-
though the hyper-parameter γ2 = 0.99 is exactly the same
as that of the evaluation opponent, the evaluation reward is
still significantly worse than the training reward. This is not
surprising, as agent could learn different policies even with
the same hyper-parameter setting. Therefore, overfitting is
almost inevitable when training against single model.
Belief space policy vs. RNN
To answer the second question, we replaced belief space pol-
icy with a recurrent policy parameterized by a LSTM. Fig.
4 and Table 1 show the comparison between these two set-
tings, where the belief space policy consistently outperforms
the recurrent policy. This result agrees with our conjecture
that learning recurrent policy might be difficult due to lack of
prior knowledge on the information structure and the high-
variance state-space reward.
Table 1: Mean reward: v.s. LSTM (Training / Evaluation)
Algorithm Protagonist Enemy
belief space, with EO & CE -13.2 / -14.4 -90.8 / -83.0
LSTM, with EO & CE -16.5 / -17.7 -80.6 / -66.2
belief space, w/o EO & CE -11.8 / -16.5 -73.8 / -58.6
LSTM, w/o EO & CE -17.2 / -16.8 -54.2 / -49.4
Ablation study
To answer the third question, we compared our algorithm
with its ablated versions: (I) without neuro-evolution, (II)
without both neuro-evolution and ensemble optimization.
For the ablated version II, we randomly sampled subsets of
the ensemble from its powerset, and used the fixed subset for
training. Fig. 5 and Table 2 show the training and evaluation
rewards of the full and ablated versions of our algorithm.
The result suggests that both neuro-evolution and ensemble
optimization have important contribution to the performance
improvement.
Table 2: Mean reward: ablation study (Training / Evaluation)
Ablated version Protagonist Enemy
with EO & CE -13.2 / -14.4 -90.8 / -83.0
w.o EO -15.0 / -15.6 -73.6 / -65.8
w.o EO & CE -11.8 / -16.5 -73.8 / -58.6
Contributions
Our contributions can be summarized as follow:
• We propose a new decision-making framework, POS-
GEOS modified from POSG, which is suitable for rea-
soning in scenarios involving uncertain opponent types.
• Within this framework, we propose algorithms based on
MARL and ensemble training for robust opponent mod-
eling and posterior inference over the opponent type from
the observed action.
• We propose an explicit metrics for policy robustness eval-
uation, and formulate a stochastic optimization to maxi-
mize robustness and minimize computation complexity.
• We empirically demonstrate that the explicit opponent
modeling outperforms a black-box RNN approach, and
the stochastic optimization results in better results (in
terms of the robustness-complexity trade-off) than stan-
dard ensemble training approach.
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